Abstract. Lossy trapdoor functions, introduced by Peikert and Waters (STOC '08), are functions that can be generated in two indistinguishable ways: either the function is injective, and there is a trapdoor to invert it, or the function is lossy, meaning that the size of its range is strictly smaller than the size of its domain. Kiltz, O'Neill, and Smith (CRYPTO 2010) showed that the RSA trapdoor function is lossy under the Φ-Hiding assumption of Cachin, Micali, and Stadler (EUROCRYPT '99) and used this result to provide a security proof for the RSA-OAEP encryption scheme in the standard model. More recently, Kakvi and Kiltz (EUROCRYPT 2012) used the lossiness of RSA to show that the RSA Full Domain Hash signature scheme has a tight security reduction from the Φ-Hiding assumption. In this work, we consider the Rabin trapdoor function, i.e. modular squaring over Z * N . We show that when adequately restricting its domain (either to the set QR N of quadratic residues, or to (JN ) + , the set of positive integers 1 ≤ x ≤ (N − 1)/2 with Jacobi symbol +1) the Rabin trapdoor function is lossy, the injective mode corresponding to Blum integers N = pq with p, q ≡ 3 mod 4, and the lossy mode corresponding to what we call pseudo-Blum integers N = pq with p, q ≡ 1 mod 4. This lossiness result holds under a natural extension of the Φ-Hiding assumption to the case e = 2 that we call the 2-Φ/4-Hiding assumption. We then use this result to prove that deterministic variants of Rabin-Williams Full Domain Hash signatures have a tight reduction from the 2-Φ/4-Hiding assumption, therefore answering one of the main questions left open by Bernstein (EUROCRYPT 2008) in his work on Rabin-Williams signatures.
Introduction

Background
Lossy Trapdoor Functions. Lossy Trapdoor Functions (LTF) were introduced by Peikert and Waters [PW08] and have since then found a wide range of applications in cryptography such as deterministic public-key encryption [BFO08] , hedged public-key encryption [BBN + 09], and security against selective opening attacks [ BHY09, FHKW10] to name a few. Informally, an LTF consists of two families of functions: functions in the first family are injective (and efficiently invertible using some trapdoor), while functions in the second family are noninjective and hence lose information on their input. The key requirement for an LTF is that functions sampled from the first and the second family be computationally indistinguishable. Many constructions of LTF are known from various hardness assumptions such as DDH, LWE, etc. [PW08] .
Lossiness of RSA and Applications. Kiltz, O'Neill, and Smith showed [KOS10] that the RSA trapdoor function f : x → x e mod N , where N = pq is an RSA modulus, is lossy under the Φ-Hiding assumption, introduced by Cachin, Micali, and Stadler [CMS99] . When e is coprime with φ(N ) (φ(·) is Euler's totient function), f is injective on the domain Z * N , while when e divides φ(N ) (but e 2 does not), f is e-to-1 on Z * N . The Φ-Hiding assumption states that given (N, e) where e < N 1/4 , it is hard to tell whether gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1 or e|φ(N ), which corresponds to respectively the injective and lossy modes of the RSA function. Kiltz et al. [KOS10] then showed that lossiness of RSA implies that the RSA-OAEP encryption scheme [BR94] meets indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks in the standard model (under appropriate assumptions on the hash functions used to instantiate OAEP). Subsequently, Kakvi and Kiltz [KK12] showed that the Full Domain Hash (FDH) signature scheme [BR93] , when used with a trapdoor function which is lossy, has a tight reduction from the problem of distinguishing the injective from the lossy mode of the LTF (previously, only a loose reduction from the problem of inverting the underlying injective mode of the trapdoor function was known [Cor00, Cor02] ). See the discussion in [KK12] regarding the importance of tight security reductions for setting security parameters.
Contributions of this Work
Lossiness of the Rabin Trapdoor Function. We show that the Rabin trapdoor function, i.e. modular squaring, is lossy (with exactly one or two bits of lossiness) when adequately restricting its domain. Since any quadratic residue modulo an RSA modulus N = pq has exactly four square roots, it is not immediately obvious how to render this function injective. It is well known that when N is a so-called Blum integer, i.e. p, q ≡ 3 mod 4, any quadratic residue has a unique square root which is also a quadratic residue, named its principal square root. Hence, in this case, modular squaring defines a permutation over the set of quadratic residues QR N . One potential problem with this definition of the injective mode is that the domain of the permutation is (presumably) not efficiently recognizable (this is exactly the Quadratic Residuosity assumption). A different way to restrict the domain of modular squaring is to consider the set (J N ) + of integers 1 ≤ x ≤ (N −1)/2 with Jacobi symbol +1 (which is efficiently recognizable). We show that when restricting its domain to either QR N or (J N ) + to make it injective, modular squaring becomes an LTF. The lossy mode corresponds to integers N = pq such that p, q ≡ 1 mod 4, that we call pseudo-Blum integers. It can be shown that in that case, modular squaring becomes 4-to-1 over QR N and 2-to-1 over (J N ) + . Indistinguishability of the injective and lossy modes is then exactly the problem of distinguishing Blum from pseudo-Blum integers, which is equivalent to tell whether 2 divides φ(N )/4 or not. This can be seen as the extension of the traditional Φ-Hiding assumption to exponent e = 2, so that we call this problem the 2-Φ/4-Hiding problem. Details can be found in Sections 2 and 3.
Application to Rabin-Williams Signatures. We apply our finding to the security of deterministic Rabin-Williams Full Domain Hash signatures. The Rabin signature scheme [Rab79] is one of the oldest provably secure digital signature scheme. Its security relies on the difficulty of computing modular square roots, which is equivalent to factoring integers. Given an RSA modulus N = pq, the general principle of Rabin signatures is to first map the message m ∈ {0, 1} * to a quadratic residue h modulo N using some hash function H, and then return a square root s of h. Since only 1/4 of integers in Z * N are quadratic residues, directly using h = H(m) mod N will fail for roughly 3 out of 4 messages. This can be coped with using a randomized padding. The simplest one, Probabilistic Full Domain Hash with -bit salts ( -PFDH) [Cor02] , computes h = H(r, m) for random -bit salts r, until h is a quadratic residue (r is then included in the signature for verification). A way to avoid this probabilistic method is to use a tweak, as proposed by Williams [Wil80] . For any RSA modulus N , one can find four values α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ∈ Z * N such that for any h ∈ Z * N , there is a unique i ∈ [1; 4] such that α −1 i h mod N is a quadratic residue. 1 When p ≡ 3 mod 8 and q ≡ 7 mod 8, one can use the set of values {1, −1, 2, −2}. This way, the signature becomes a so-called tweaked square root (α i , s), where s is a square root of α Since any quadratic residue modulo an RSA modulus N has four square roots, one must also specify which (tweaked) square root of the hash to use as the signature. There are basically two ways to proceed. The first one is simply to pick a square root at random. However, when no randomization (or randomization with only a small number of bits) is used in the input to the hash function, one must be careful not to output two non-trivially distinct square roots if the same message is signed twice, since this would reveal the factorization of the modulus N . In consequence, the signature algorithm must either be stateful and store all signatures previously output, or generate the bits for deciding which root to use pseudo-randomly (how exactly this is done is not always precisely discussed, and may have security implications as explained in [LN09] ). 2 The second option is to define some deterministic rule telling which square root to use as the signature. The most popular way to do so is to use for N a Blum integer and to use the principal square root. A variant is to use what we call the absolute principal square root, i.e. |s mod N |, where s is the principal square root represented by an integer in [−(N − 1)/2; (N − 1)/2]. This turns out to also be the unique square root in (J N ) + . We will call these ways to choose a square root Principal Rabin Williams (PRW) and Absolute 1 The sufficient condition for this is that the pairs of Legendre symbols ( Principal Rabin-Williams (APRW) respectively. 3 When no randomization in the input to the hash function is used, the signature algorithm then becomes entirely deterministic, which is attractive from an implementation point of view. Bernstein [Ber08] proposed an extensive study of possible variants of Rabin-Williams signature schemes depending on the length of the salt and the square root selection method. In particular, for FDH signatures, he showed a tight security reduction from the factoring assumption for the probabilistic square root selection method (Fixed Unstructured). On the other hand, for PRW and APRW, only a loose reduction from factoring is known using methods of Coron [Cor00, Ber08] . The question whether there exists a tight security reduction for these schemes was left as an open problem in [Ber08] . Our main result is a tight security reduction from the 2-Φ/4-Hiding problem for the PRW and APRW schemes, building on the results of [KK12] . Details can be found in Section 4.
Related and Future Work
Two constructions of lossy trapdoor functions based on modular squaring were previously proposed, however they are slightly more complicated than the basic Rabin trapdoor function. The cryptographic applications of the set (J N ) + when N is a Blum integer were previously considered by Hofheinz and Kiltz [HK09] (it was denoted QR + N in their work and named group of signed quadratic residues). In particular, they showed that the Strong Diffie-Hellman problem [ABR01] is hard in this group under the factoring assumption.
An interesting question is whether lossiness of the Rabin trapdoor function can be used to argue about the security of Rabin-OAEP encryption as was done in [KOS10] for RSA. Though from a theoretical point of view the results of [KOS10] apply to OAEP used with any LTF, they provide some meaningful security insurance only when the amount of lossiness is sufficiently high. This requires more careful investigation in the case of Rabin-OAEP. As a first step in this direction, we note that if "multi-primes" pseudo-Blum integers N = p 1 · · · p m , with p 1 , . . . , p m ≡ 1 mod 4 are indistinguishable from 2-primes pseudo-Blum integers, lossiness of the Rabin trapdoor function with domain (J N ) + can be amplified from 1 bit to m − 1 bits. Similar arguments were used for RSA in [KOS10] .
Preliminaries
General Notation
The set of integers i such that a ≤ i ≤ b will be denoted [a; b]. The security parameter will be denoted k. A function f of the security parameter is said negligible if for any c > 0, f (k) ≤ 1/k c for sufficiently large k. When S is a non-empty finite set, we write s ← $ S to mean that a value is sampled uniformly at random from S and assigned to s.
we denote the operation of running the (possibly probabilistic) algorithm A on inputs x, y, . . . with access to oracles O 1 , O 2 , . . . (possibly none), and letting z be the output. PPT will stand for probabilistic polynomial-time.
Definitions
Given an (odd for most of what follows) integer N , the multiplicative group of integers modulo N is denoted Z * N . This group has order φ(N ) where φ(·) is the Euler function. We denote J N the subgroup of Z * N of all elements x ∈ Z * N with Jacobi symbol x N = 1. This subgroup has index 2 and order φ(N )/2 in Z * N . Moreover it is efficiently recognizable even without the factorization of N since the Jacobi symbol is efficiently computable given only N . We also denote J N the coset of elements x ∈ Z * N such that x N = −1. Finally, we denote QR N the subgroup of quadratic residues of Z * N . This subgroup is widely believed not to be efficiently recognizable when N is composite and its factorization is unknown: this is the Quadratic Residuosity assumption.
We will represent elements of Z N as signed integers in [−(N − 1)/2, (N − 1)/2]. Given an integer x, we denote |x mod N | the absolute value of x mod N . For any subset S ⊂ Z N , we denote
We call an integer N = pq which is the product of two distinct odd primes a Blum integer when p, q ≡ 3 mod 4 , and a pseudo-Blum integer when p, q ≡ 1 mod 4 , and we denote
We call a Blum integer N = pq such that moreover p ≡ 3 mod 8 and q ≡ 7 mod 8 a Williams integer, and a pseudo-Blum integer such that p ≡ 5 mod 8 and q ≡ 1 mod 8 a pseudo-Williams integer. We denote
Note that: 
Proof. Consider x ∈ QR N . Denote x p = x mod p and x q = x mod q. Let also ±r p and ±r q denote the two square roots of respectively x p (mod p) and x q (mod q). 
Consequently:
-when N is a Blum integer, s 1 and s 2 have opposite Jacobi symbols; moreover, assuming s 1 ∈ (J N ) + then since −1 is a non-quadratic residue, either s 1 ∈ QR N or −s 1 ∈ QR N ; -when N is a pseudo-Blum integer, we see that
from which the claim on the localization of the four square roots follows.
This concludes the proof.
Hence when N is a Blum integer, the two absolute square roots can easily be distinguished through their Jacobi symbol. In the following, given a Blum integer N and x ∈ QR N , we will call the unique square root of x which is in QR N the principal square root of x, and denote it psr(x). We will also call the unique square root of x which is in (J N ) + the absolute principal square root of x, and will denote it |psr|(x). The notation is chosen so that |psr|(x) = |psr(x) mod N |.
Tweaked Square Roots. Let N be a Williams integer. Then for any x ∈ Z * N there is a unique α ∈ {1, −1, 2, −2} such that α −1 x mod N is a quadratic residue. 4 The four pairs (α, s i ) i=1,...,4 where (s i ) i=1,...,4 are the four square roots of α −1 x mod N are named the tweaked square roots of x, and α is named the tweak. Hence, (α, s) with α ∈ {1, −1, 2, −2} is a tweaked square root of x ∈ Z * N iff αs 2 = x mod N . By extension, the principal tweaked square root of x is the unique tweaked square root (α, s) such that s ∈ QR N , and the absolute principal tweaked square root is the unique tweaked square root (α, s) such that s ∈ (J N ) + . Overloading the notation, they will be denoted respectively psr(x) and |psr|(x). roughly states that given an RSA modulus N = pq and a random prime 3 ≤ e < N 1/4 , it is hard to distinguish whether e divides φ(N ) or not (when e ≥ N 1/4 and e|φ(N ), N can be factored using Coppersmith's method for finding small roots of univariate modular equations [Cop96, CMS99] ). Kiltz et al. [KOS10] were the first to observe that the Φ-Hiding assumption can be interpreted in terms of lossiness of the RSA trapdoor permutation.
The original definition of the Φ-Hiding assumption was formulated for primes e randomly drawn in [3; N 1/4 [. Since in practice RSA is often used with a fixed, small prime e (e.g. e = 3 or e = 2 16 + 1), Kakvi and Kiltz [KK12] introduced the Fixed-Prime Φ-Hiding assumption, which states, for a fixed prime e, that it is hard, given an RSA modulus N = pq, to distinguish whether e divides φ(N ) or not (the exact statement of the assumption is slightly different for e = 3 and e > 3 in order to avoid trivial distinguishers). The 2-Φ/4-Hiding assumption is the extension of the Fixed-Prime Φ-Hiding assumption to the case e = 2. Since for an RSA modulus N (more generally for any number which has at least two distinct prime factors) one always has that 4 divides φ(N ), the problem will be to distinguish whether 2 divides φ(N )/4 or not. Moreover, when N ≡ 3 mod 4, one can check that 2 always divides φ(N )/4, so that the instances will be restricted to RSA moduli such that N ≡ 1 mod 4. As a matter of fact, distinguishing whether 2 divides φ(N )/4 or not when N ≡ 1 mod 4 turns out to be equivalent to distinguishing Blum integers from pseudo-Blum integers. Indeed, if N is a Blum integer, then p = 4p + 3 and q = 4q + 3, so that φ(N ) = 4(2p + 1)(2q + 1) and 2 (φ(N )/4). On the other hand, if N is a pseudo-Blum integer, then p = 4p + 1 and q = 4q + 1, so that φ(N ) = 16p q and 2|(φ(N )/4). We now precisely formalize the assumption.
Definition 1 (2-Φ/4-Hiding Assumption.). We say that the 2-Φ/4-Hiding problem is (t, ε)-hard if for any algorithm A running in time at most t, the following advantage is less than ε:
A variant of this problem is obtained by switching from Blum integers to Williams integers, i.e. replacing Bl(k) and Bl(k) in the above definition by respectively Wi(k) and Wi(k). Clearly, the hardness of this variant is polynomially related to the hardness of the original problem, under the plausible assumption that roughly half of Blum, resp. pseudo-Blum integers are Williams, resp. pseudo-Williams integers.
Lossiness of the Rabin Trapdoor Function
We now show that the 2-Φ/4-Hiding assumption implies that squaring is a lossy trapdoor function over the domains QR N or (J N ) + , for N ≡ 1 mod 4, with respectively two bits or one bit of lossiness. The injective mode corresponds to N being a Blum integer, and the lossy mode corresponds to N being a pseudo-Blum integer. We first recall the formal definition of a lossy trapdoor function (our definitions follow closely the ones of [KK12] ).
Definition 2 (Trapdoor Function.). A trapdoor function (TDF) is a tuple of polynomialtime algorithms TDF = (InjGen, Eval, Invert) with the following properties:
-InjGen(1 k ): a probabilistic algorithm which on input the security parameter 1 k , outputs a public description pub (with implicitly understood domain D pub ) and a trapdoor td; -Eval(pub, x): a deterministic algorithm which on input pub and a point x ∈ D pub , outputs a point y ∈ {0, 1} * ; we denote f pub : x → Eval(pub, x); -Invert(td, y): a deterministic algorithm which on input td and a point y ∈ {0, 1} * , outputs a point x ∈ D pub when y ∈ f pub (D pub ) (and ⊥ otherwise).
We require that for any k and any (pub, td) possibly output by InjGen(1 k ), the function f pub : x → Eval(pub, x) be injective, and y → Invert(td, y) be its inverse f −1 pub . We also require that D pub and f pub (D pub ) be efficiently samplable. 
Definition 3 (Lossy Trapdoor Function.). A lossy trapdoor function (LTF) with absolute lossiness is a tuple of algorithms
|D pub | |f pub (D pub )| ≥ .
We say that LTF is (t, ε)-secure if for any adversary running in time at most t, the following advantage is less than ε:
Pr[(pub, td) ← InjGen(1 k ) : 1 ← A(pub)] − Pr[pub ← LossyGen(1 k ) : 1 ← A(pub )] .
We say that LTF is a regular ( , t, ε)-lossy trapdoor function if LTF is (t, ε)-secure and all functions generated by LossyGen are -to-1 on D pub .
Note that we do not require that a LTF be (strongly) one-way since this is not needed to apply the result of [KK12] . On the other hand, one can easily check that any TDF that satisfies Definition 3 with constant (as is the case for the trapdoor functions considered in this paper) is weakly one-way [Gol01] .
We define two related LTF, that we name respectively the Principal Rabin LTF PR-LTF and the Absolute Principal Rabin LTF APR-LTF as follows: while APR-LTF.Invert((p, q), y) outputs the absolute principal square root |psr|(y) (for N a Blum integer and y ∈ QR N ).
Theorem 1. Assuming the 2-Φ/4-Hiding problem is (t, ε)-hard, the Principal Rabin trapdoor function is a regular (4, t, ε)-LTF, while the Absolute Principal Rabin trapdoor function is a regular (2, t, ε)-LTF.
Proof. Indistinguishability of the injective and lossy modes is exactly the 2-Φ/4-Hiding problem. It follows from Lemma 1 that when N is a Blum integer, any y ∈ QR N has exactly one pre-image in QR N or (J N ) + , while when N is pseudo-Blum integer, any y in the range f N (QR N ) has exactly 4 pre-images in QR N , and any y in the range f N ((J N ) + ) has exactly 2 pre-images in (J N ) + .
Remark 1. Note that one can define a group structure on (J N ) + as soon as N is a Blum or pseudo-Blum integer as follows. Since −1 ∈ J N , one can consider the quotient group J N /{−1, 1}. This quotient group can be identified with the set (J N ) + equipped with the group operation • defined as a • b = |ab mod N |. Note that the order of this group is φ(N )/4. It is then easy to check that squaring, seen as a mapping from (J N ) + to QR N , is a group homomorphism. When N is a Blum integer, its image is QR N , whereas when N is a pseudoBlum integer, its image is a strict subgroup of QR N of index 2. Similarly, when N is a pseudo-Blum integer, the image of QR N is a strict subgroup of QR N of index 4.
Application to Rabin-Williams Signatures
Definitions
We recall the formal definition and the security notion for a signature scheme. We require that the scheme be correct, i.e. for all k and all messages m,
A signature scheme is said to have unique signatures if for all k, for any public key pk possibly output by KeyGen(1 k ), and any messages m ∈ {0, 1} * , there is exactly one string σ such that Ver(pk, m, σ) accepts.
The usual security definition for a signature scheme is existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA security). We recall this definition in Appendix B.
FDH Signatures Based on an Arbitrary TDF. Let TDF = (InjGen, Eval, Invert) be a TDF. The Full Domain Hash signature scheme TDF-FDH is defined as follows: the key generation algorithm KeyGen(1 k ) runs InjGen(1 k ) to obtain (pub, td), selects a random hash function H : {0, 1} * → f pub (D pub ), and sets pk = (pub, H) and sk = td. The signature algorithm, on input td and m, computes h = H(m) and returns σ = Invert(td, h). The verification algorithm, on input pub, m and σ, checks that Eval(pub, σ) = H(m). This scheme can be shown EUF-CMA secure in the Random Oracle Model under the assumption that TDF is (strongly) one-way [BR93, Cor00] , but the reduction must loose a factor q s , where q s is the number of signature queries of the adversary, assuming the TDF is certified [Cor02, KK12] .
Tight Security for Deterministic Rabin-Williams Signatures
There are two very close ways to define deterministic Rabin-Williams FDH signatures, called principal and |principal| in the terminology of Bernstein [Ber08] . We will use the name Absolute Principal Rabin-Williams signatures for the latter in this paper. Before defining precisely these schemes, we stress that the exact definition of the verification algorithm is important, especially with respect to how a forgery is defined (since a forgery is exactly a string which is accepted by the verification algorithm). Hence, to be more precise, we will define in total four "real" signature schemes: Principal Rabin-Williams (PRW), Absolute Principal RabinWilliams (APRW), as well as two slightly different variants that we call PRW * and APRW * , which differ from respectively PRW and APRW only in their verification algorithm. We will also define a "theoretical" scheme PRW * * where the verification algorithm is inefficient (this will be necessary to establish a clean security reduction). For the five schemes, the signing algorithm first hashes the message h = H(m); then, for the PRW, PRW * , and PRW * * schemes, the signing algorithm returns the principal tweaked square root of h, whereas for the APRW and APRW * schemes, the signing algorithm returns the absolute principal tweaked square root of h. In all the following, we assume that if h is not coprime with N , the signing algorithm outputs some fixed signature, e.g. (1, 1). Since this happens only with negligible probability when H is modeled as a random oracle, this does not affect the security analysis.
We now proceed to the formal definition. First, all the schemes share exactly the same key generation algorithm:
The public key is pk = (N, H) and the secret key is sk = (p, q).
Note that the hash function will usually be selected once for each security parameter k and common to all public keys, but this affects the security proof only up to negligible terms, see Bernstein [Ber08] . The signing algorithm for PRW, PRW * , and PRW * * on one hand, and for APRW and APRW * on the other hand, are the same, and are defined as follows:
-PRW( * , * * ).Sig(sk, m): To sign a message m, compute h = H(m), and output the principal tweaked square root σ = (α, s) = psr(h). -APRW( * ).Sig(sk, m): To sign a message m, compute h = H(m), and output the absolute principal tweaked square root σ = (α, s) = |psr|(h).
The verification algorithms for the five schemes are very close, and differ only with respect to an additional check on the Jacobi symbol of the signature made for PRW * and APRW * , and on the quadratic residuosity of the signature for PRW * * . They are defined as follows:
-(A)PRW( * , * * ).Ver(pk, m, σ): To check a purported signature σ = (α, s) on message m, first ensure that s ∈ S, and then check that αs 2 = H(m) mod N . Accept if this holds, and reject otherwise;
where the set S is defined as:
-S = Z * N for PRW, S = J N for PRW * , and S = QR N for PRW * * ; -S = (Z * N ) + for APRW and S = (J N ) + for APRW * .
Note that the verification algorithm is (presumably) inefficient for PRW * * since it needs to decide whether the signature is indeed the principal square root, i.e. a quadratic residue.
The following claims are straightforward:
-in PRW, each message has exactly four valid signatures: (α, s 1 ) = |psr|(H(m)), (α, −s 1 ), and (α, s 2 ), (α, −s 2 ) with s 2 ∈ (J N ) + ; -in PRW * , each message has exactly two valid signatures: (α, s) = |psr|(H(m)) and (α, −s); -in PRW * * , each message has a unique valid signature: (α, s) = psr(H(m)); -in APRW, each message has exactly two valid signatures: |psr|(H(m)) and (α, s 2 ) with s 2 ∈ (J N ) + ; -in APRW * , each message has a unique valid signature: |psr|(H(m)).
We now relate the security of PRW, PRW * , and PRW * * on one hand, and APRW and APRW * on the other hand.
Lemma 2. The security of PRW, PRW * and PRW * * on one hand, and APRW and APRW * on the other hand, is related as depicted in Figure 1 , where an arrow labeled (t, f (ε)) from scheme A to scheme B means that if scheme A is (t, ε, q h , q s )-EUF-CMA secure in the ROM, then scheme B is (t , f (ε), q h , q s )-EUF-CMA secure for t t.
Proof. We prove each of the reductions in turn.
-PRW * * (t,2ε) − −− → PRW * : Assume there is an adversary A which (t, ε, q h , q s )-breaks the PRW * scheme. We build from it an adversary A breaking the PRW * * scheme. A receives as input a public key N and runs A with the same public key. Denote H the random oracle to which A has access. A simulates the PRW * security experiment to A by simply relaying its random oracle queries and signing queries to its own oracles. When A outputs a forgery (α,ŝ) for some messagem whereŝ ∈ J N , A simply draws a random bit b, and outputs (α, (−1) bŝ ). The security experiment is perfectly simulated to A (since a PRW * * signature oracle and a PRW * signature oracle are the same), and, assuming that the forgery output by A is valid (which happens with probability at least ε), the forgery output by A is valid when (−1) bŝ is a quadratic residue, which happens with probability 1/2. Hence A (t, ε/2, q h , q s )-breaks PRW * * .
-(A)PRW * (t,2ε) − −− → (A)PRW: We consider the PRW * → PRW reduction, the reasoning for the APRW * → APRW is similar. Assume there is an adversary A which (t, ε, q h , q s )-breaks the PRW scheme. We build from it an adversary A breaking the PRW * scheme. A receives as input a public key N and runs A with the same public key. Denote H the random oracle to which A has access. We assume wlog that A always makes a random oracle query for m before asking the corresponding signature or returning a forgery for m (otherwise we let A emulate this random oracle query). We now describe how A simulates the random oracle H and the PRW signing oracle to A. where α and s were randomly drawn to simulate H(m). Clearly, the simulation of the PRW security experiment is close to perfect (up to the fact that answers to random oracle queries H(m) are uniform in Z * N rather than Z N when b m = 1). Hence A outputs a forgery (α,ŝ) for some messagem with probability at least ε. Note that this is a valid forgery for PRW, so thatŝ may be in J N or J N . Since the view of A is independent of the bit bm, we can assume that this bit is randomly drawn after the forgery is returned. Two cases arise. In case whereŝ ∈ J N , then if bm = 0, (α,ŝ) is also a valid forgery for PRW * and A can simply output the same forgery. Otherwise, in case whereŝ ∈ J N , then if bm = 1, denoting s the value randomly drawn in QR N by A to simulate the random oracle query H(m), we see thatŝ and s are two non-trivially distinct square roots of the same quadratic residue, so that A can factor N and forge a signature for a message of its choice. In both cases A is successful with probability 1/2, so that the overall success probability of A is ε/2. Hence A (t, ε/2, q h , q s )-breaks PRW * .
This proves the lemma. Hence, one can see that PRW and PRW * on one hand, and APRW and APRW * on the other hand, have the same security up to a factor 2. In other words, omitting the additional check on the Jacobi symbol has negligible impact on security. In the following, we give a tight reduction for PRW * * and APRW * from the 2-Φ/4-Hiding assumption, which extends to PRW and APRW by Lemma 2. Proof. Indistinguishability of the injective and lossy modes is exactly indistinguishability of Williams and pseudo-Williams integers, which follows from the 2-Φ/4-Hiding assumption and the additional (reasonable) assumption that Williams, resp. pseudo-Williams integers are sufficiently dense in Blum, resp. pseudo-Blum integers. Injectivity of f N for both PRW-LTF and APRW-LTF follows directly from Lemma 1 and the discussion about tweaked square roots in Section 2. Assume now that N is a pseudo-Williams integer, and let y ∈ f N (D N ) with D N = {1, −1, 2, −2} × QR N . We show that y has exactly 4 pre-images in D N , which will establish that PRW-LTF is 4-to-1 on D N . Let (α, x) ∈ D N be such that αx 2 = y mod N . Then by Lemma 1, y has at least 4 pre-images in D N , all with the same tweak α. Assume that y has an extra pre-image (α , x ) ∈ D N with α = α. Note that when N = pq is a pseudo-Williams integer (i.e. p ≡ 5 mod 8 and q ≡ 1 mod 8), the pairs of Legendre symbols ( Remark 2. In Appendix A, we give a slightly different formalization for APRW-LTF, where it is defined as a lossy trapdoor permutation over (J N ) + , and the use of tweaks is seen as a way to deterministically hash into (J N ) + . Which formalization to prefer is mainly a matter of taste.
It is then easy to see that the PRW * * , resp. APRW * signature scheme is exactly the instantiation of the generic TDF-FDH scheme recalled in Section 4.1 with PRW-LTF, resp. APRW-LTF. In order to conclude about the security of these schemes, we appeal to the main result of [KK12] . This theorem was originally stated for trapdoor permutations, but it can be straightforwardly extended to trapdoor functions such that D pub and f pub (D pub ) are efficiently samplable. LTF is a regular ( , t , ε ) 
Theorem 3 ([KK12]). Assume
